

### **REMARKS/ARGUMENTS**

Claims 1, 3, 5, 14-29 are all the claims currently pending in the application. Based on the following remarks, Applicant requests reconsideration of the application and allowance of the claims.

#### **I. Rejection of Claims 1-3, 14-15, 19-23, 25-28 & 29 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103**

Claims 1-3, 14-15, 19-23, 25-28 and 29 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lynn (U.S. Patent No. 6,595,859 hereinafter “Lynn”), Humes (U.S. Patent No. 5,996,011 hereinafter “Humes”), Swift (U.S. Patent No. 6,895,111 hereinafter Swift), and Crawford (U.S. Patent No. 6,781,608 hereinafter “Crawford”).

Claim 1 requires, “[a] system ... comprising,” *inter alia*, “an integrated circuit ... for processing said image data, wherein, for each of the plural pixels, said *image data comprises* at least *first and second* portions of image data that are *linked together*, the *first portion* including *payload data* and the *second portion* including *metadata*, wherein said payload data comprises content for the pixel and said *metadata comprises a value* selected from a predefined set of values *which classifies the pixel independently from the other pixels*, whereby, because *each of the processable pixels are individually classified* according to a *particular metadata value* selected from the predefined set of values, said integrated circuit is able to perform operations on individual pixels based on their metadata, said integrated circuit comprising: *a filter for obscuring the content of only a plurality of pixels that has a metadata value that exceeds a discretionary threshold value* without preventing the display of the content of the remaining plurality of pixels that *does not have a metadata value that exceeds the discretionary threshold value*.”

Applicant respectfully submits that the combination of Lynn, Humes, Swift and Crawford does not teach or suggest at least the above features of claim 1. In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner relies on column 1, lines 43-67, column 3, lines 14-25, column 4, lines 10-24, column 5, lines 22-30 and FIGS. 2-3 of Lynn as teaching the claim recitation “a display for displaying image data, the display comprising a plurality of pixels; and an integrated circuit in connection with said display for processing said image data, wherein, for each of the plural pixels, said

image data comprises at least first and second portions of image data that are linked together, the first portion including payload data and the second portion including metadata, wherein said payload data comprises content for the pixel and said metadata comprises a value selected from a predefined set of values which classifies the pixel independently from the other pixels, whereby, because each of the processable pixels are individually classified according to a particular metadata value selected from the predefined set of values, said integrated circuit is able to perform operations on individual pixels based on their metadata.” (See pgs. 2-3 of the Office Action) Applicant respectfully disagrees and submits that the Examiner is misconstruing the teachings of the combination.

In contrast to claim 1, the cited portion of Lynn merely discloses that it relates to an Internet marketing game for promoting access to a web site which hosts the game and to keep potential consumers occupied on the web site for exposure to several different advertising spaces. Lynn explains that the “game is centered around ‘a point and click’ system in which a screen display is provided which includes an image made up of a large number” of pixels. (See Col. 1, lines 43-67) Lynn further discloses that a player moves a cursor around the image and randomly selects a pixel or image area on the image. The x-y coordinate location of the pixel or image area is then compared against stored x-y coordinates “for winning pixel or image area location(s).” (See *id.*) The cited portion of Lynn further describes the logic of the Internet Marketing Game. (See Col. 3, lines 7-25 of Lynn) In particular, the cited portion of Lynn explains that a game server is started and represents the loading of error files and that bonus information for a particular period is (“e.g. a 24 hour period”) is loaded. (See *id.* & FIG. 1a of Lynn) The cited portion further discloses that the bonus information includes parameters for “bonus and ‘secret bonus’ rounds” having parameters being read from the file and parsed into its particular internal representation. The cited portion further describes that image information for the particular image being used for the game is loaded and explains that “[t]he rules of the game dictate that only pixel or image areas selected within the image boundaries can be [a] winning” location(s) “e.g. ... tree foliage.” (See *id.*)

Column 4, lines 10-24 of Lynn, at best, describes that if a request is a game request “in the form of a code including a selected (x,y) pixel or image area coordinate location on the tree, the specific game situation for which the request was generated” “and a verification that the

request was originating by a 'click' on the game image from the player's browser" is generated. (See also FIG. 1b of Lynn) Lynn also explains that "the selected pixel or image area location is compared against the winning pixel or image area locations for the prize list for that time period of order to determine" if the selection is a winner. (See Col. 4, lines 10-24 of Lynn)

Column 4, line 63 to column 7, lines 1-15 of Lynn which relates to FIG. 2, at best, discloses that the FIG. 2 "illustrates a representative web site for the ... Internet marketing game" and explains that the web page 52 includes a welcome banner 53 "exclaiming the prizes available," "alternative buttons" and various "administrative selection areas" including a "selection area 76 which allows a player to access the game page." Column 5, lines 16-30 of Lynn relates to FIG. 3 and, at best, discloses that "FIG. 3 illustrates a representative game page" having an "image of a 'money tree' 82" and a banner 84 "inviting [a] player to 'play as many times as ... [he/she] would like for free!'" Column 5, lines 16-30 of Lynn further explains that game page 81 contains other banners e.g., 85, 86 and other advertisements 87, 88 "designed to catch the eye of a player."

In view of the foregoing, nowhere in the cited portion of Lynn, or any other portion of the combination is there any mention, teaching or suggestion relating to an integrated circuit which processes image data, for *each of the plural pixels*, comprising first and second portions that are linked together. At best, Lynn, either individually or in combination with Humes, Swift, and Crawford, merely discloses that a user/player clicks on a pixel or image area of the game page and that this pixel is "compared against stored x-y coordinates for a winning pixel ... location(s)" so that a player can win a prize. (Col. 1, lines 53-61 of Lynn) Lynn, either individually or in combination with Humes, Swift and Crawford, is simply altogether silent regarding the makeup of each of the respective pixels in the image pertaining to the Internet marketing game page disclosed therein and there certainly is no teaching or suggestion relating to each of the plural pixels having a first portion including payload data and a second portion including metadata, as required by claim 1. Given that Lynn, in combination with Humes, Swift and Crawford, does not teach or suggest that each of the respective pixels of the Internet marketing game page includes payload data and metadata, the combination also fails to teach or suggest that the "*payload data comprises content for the pixel and ... metadata comprises a value selected from a predefined set of values which classifies the pixel independently from the*

other pixels,” as claimed. As pointed out above, nowhere in the cited portions of Lynn, either individually or in combination with Humes, Swift and Crawford is there any teaching or suggestion relating to each of the pixels disclosed therein having a metadata value which classifies each of the pixels.

There is simply no mention, teaching or suggestion, in Lynn, either individually or in combination with Humes, Swift and Crawford, pertaining to the pixels disclosed therein containing values that are used to classify each of the respective pixels, as suggested by the Examiner<sup>1</sup> and as required by claim 1. Moreover, there is no teaching or suggestion in Lynn, either individually or in combination with Humes, Swift and Crawford, relating to classification of pixels generally either. Based on at least the foregoing, Applicant submits that the combination is deficient and does not teach or suggest all of the features of claim 1.

Additionally, Applicant notes that the Examiner correctly concedes that Lynn does not teach or suggest all of the features of claim 1. However, the Examiner relies on Humes to make up for *some* of the deficiencies of Lynn and asserts that Humes in combination with Lynn “teaches a filter for blocking the content of only a plurality of pixels that has a metadata value that exceeds a discretionary threshold value without preventing the display of the content of the plurality of pixels that does not have a metadata value that exceeds the discretionary threshold value.” (See pg. 3 of the Office Action) In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner relies on “col. 2, lines 56-63, col. 3, lines 1-8; [and] col. 4, lines 55-58” of Humes as teaching the above feature of claim 1. (See pg. 3 of the Office Action) Applicant respectfully disagrees.

In contrast to claim 1, Humes, at best, relates to filtering of objectionable target “text data from World Wide Web pages ... received by a computer system connected to the Internet.” (See Col. 1, lines 9-11 & Col. 2, lines 48-51 of Humes) (emphasis added) As pointed out in the Amendment filed August 23, 2006, column 2, lines 56-63 of Humes merely discloses a method for filtering text data in which “if the web page requested by the user contains only a minimum of objectionable or target data, the user receives a portion of the filtered web page for downloading and viewing on his ... computer. While, if the web page requested contains a large amount of objectionable material,” “a ‘forbidden’ page [is] displayed on the user’s monitor.

---

<sup>1</sup> See pgs. 2-3 of the Office Action.

Humes further discloses that the request is sequentially filtered at three different levels. First, the URL requested is filtered to determine if the web page associated with that URL has been pre-approved or pre-denied. Second, if the URL has not been pre-approved or pre-denied, the header of the web page is filtered to determine if the web page contains text data (such as HTML). Third, if the body contains text data, the body of the web page is filtered and describes that “[w]hile the filter will decide whether or not to block access to the entire web page based on the URL, ... the filter may deny access completely to the web page (i.e., filter out some objectionable words), or allow complete access to the web page.” (Col. 3, lines 1-8 of Humes)

The cited portion of Humes further discloses that a sever computer 110 filters any request it receives for a web page from a client computer 120 and outputs to the client computer 120 only those web pages, or portions of web pages that are appropriate for viewing by the user of the client computer 120 and explains that the filtering takes place in at least three stages (i.e., filtered at the three different levels, as discussed above). (Col. 4, lines 55-58 of Humes)

During the first stage, Humes explains that a requested URL is compared to an “allow list” containing URLs of web pages that are approved for display. If the requested URL is in the allow list, the entire associated web page is forwarded to the user. But if the requested URL is not in the allow list, the URL is compared to a “deny list” and if the requested URL is in the deny list a message is sent to the user’s computer indicating that access to the web page is forbidden. Humes further describes that if the requested URL is not found in either the “allow list” or the “deny list” the second stage is invoked and an HTTP header is filtered to determine whether the web page contains text data. If the page contains objectionable text, Humes explains that a determination is made as to the “kind of objectionable test (specific words)” and that the objectionable words are either replaced with an innocuous filler (such as ‘ - - -’) before the web page is forwarded to the user’s computer or a ‘FORBIDDEN’ page is forwarded to the user’s computer. If the web page does not contain text data that “Filter” variable is set to “Off” and the web page is sent to the user’s computer. (See Col. 3, lines 10-36 & Col. 7, lines 9-21 of Humes)

During the third stage, Humes explains that the if filtering of the header reveals that web page contains text, the text of the web page is filtered by comparing each ‘word’ (defined by groupings of letter/number D characters) in the web page to a ‘dictionary.’” (See Col. 3, lines 37-67 of Humes)

Humes further explains that “each word in the dictionary has a number of variables associated with it.” For instance, Humes discloses that a variable may indicate whether the word, if found should be replaced with the innocuous filler (or a specific replacement filler word). In lieu of replacing an objectionable word, a replacement word or innocuous filler, Humes further explains that a running score of words on the web page is determined for the entire web page and if the final score for the page is above a predetermined threshold score, a ‘FORBIDDEN’ page is forwarded to the user’s computer. (See Col. 3, line 67 to Col. 4, lines 1-4 & Col. 7, lines 48-59 of Humes)

In view of the foregoing, and as pointed out in the Amendment dated August 23, 2007, Humes, at best, teaches word based and text-based filtering. To be precise, Humes merely discloses filtering which blocks the words and text of a web-page from being sent and displayed to the user’s computer or alternatively blocks the web page altogether, if a final score for the web page exceeds a threshold, as discussed above. Nowhere in the cited portion of the Humes, either individually or in combination with Lynn, Swift and Crawford, is there any mention, teaching or suggestion relating to a filter for blocking the content of *only* a plurality of *pixels* that *has* a metadata value that *exceeds a discretionary threshold value*, as claimed. There is simply no teaching or suggestion in Humes pertaining to any pixels disclosed therein which has a metadata value and there certainly is no teaching or suggestion of a pixel that has a metadata value that may exceed a threshold value, as required by claim 1. Rather, Humes, at best, discloses that “each word in the dictionary [i.e., not the pixels of the web page] has a number of variables”<sup>2</sup> which may indicate whether to replace the word on the web page with a specific replacement filler (e.g. “replac[ing] objectionable word ‘darn’ for ‘damn’”—See Col. 7, lines 51-53 of Humes) or an innocuous filler (e.g., “ - - ”), irrespective of any comparison to a threshold value. Additionally, Humes explains that “if the total score of the web page exceeds the predetermined threshold, e.g., 50, then the entire page is replaced with a ‘FORBIDDEN’ page.” (Col. 7, lines 55-59 of Humes) Given that the total score of the web page is compared to a predetermined threshold and not a metadata value of each of a plurality of pixels and since words in the dictionary have variables and not each of the pixels of Humes, the combination fails to teach or

---

<sup>2</sup> Col. 3, lines 50-51 of Humes. (emphasis added)

suggest at least “a filter for obscuring the content of only a plurality of pixels that has a metadata value that exceeds a discretionary threshold value *without preventing the display* of the content of the remaining plurality of pixels that *does not have a metadata value that exceeds the discretionary threshold value*,” as claimed.

Applicant again notes that the Examiner correctly concedes that Lynn and Humes in combination does not teach or suggest all of the features of claim 1 but relies on Swift to make up for *some* of the deficiencies of Lynn and Humes. In particular, the Examiner relies on column 3, lines 10-47, FIGS. 2 and 3 and the graphic image file analysis routine 160, disclosed therein, in combination with Lynn, Humes and Crawford as teaching features of claim 1. (See pg. 3 of the Office Action) Applicant respectfully disagrees.

The cited portion of Swift, at best, discloses a “computer system ... with associated programming to evaluate spectral components of each pixel to classify” each pixel as not representing human skin (NS) or possibly representing human skin (PS). (See Col. 3, lines 10-47 of Swift) (emphasis added) Given that Swift discloses a program of a computer system that evaluates spectral components of each pixel in order to classify each pixel, Swift, either individually or in combination with Lynn, Humes and Crawford, is incapable of teaching or suggesting that each pixel has metadata comprising *a value* which classifies the pixel independently from other pixels, as claimed. Nowhere in Swift is there any teaching or suggestion, and the Examiner cites to none, relating to each pixel, disclosed therein having metadata comprising *a value* which classifies the pixel and a *metadata value* that exceeds a discretionary threshold value. FIGS. 2-3 of Swift merely relate to a “WEB PAGE EVALUATION” routine 130 and a “GRAPHIC IMAGE FILE ANALYSIS” routine 160, respectively. (See Col. 5, lines 29-30 & col. 7, lines 29-31 of Swift) Column 8, lines 35-43 of Swift, which relates to FIG. 3, explains that the spectral components of a graphic image are evaluated by the routine 160, i.e., program to classify each pixel as a “NS” pixel or a “PS” pixel. FIGS. 2-3 of Swift, the graphic image file analysis routine 160 of Swift and any other portions of Swift are simply altogether silent regarding any pixels that contain metadata and there certainly is no teaching or suggestion relating to each pixel having metadata with a value for classification and another value that is compared to a threshold value. As known to those skilled in the art, spectral components of a pixel do not teach or suggest metadata having a value that classifies a

pixel and another value that is compared to a threshold value. (See e.g. FIG. 2 of the present application & lines 1-7 of the specification which demonstrates that the RGB bits are not the same as metadata)

As such, in contrast to the Examiner's general allegation, Swift, either alone or in combination with Lynn, Humes and Crawford, does not teach or suggest "a filter for detecting the content of a plurality of pixels that has a metadata value that exceeds a discretionary threshold value," as suggested by the Examiner. (See pg. 3 of the Office Action) (emphasis added) Based on at least the foregoing reasons, the combination is deficient and does not teach or suggest the features of claim 1 for these additional reasons.

Applicant notes that the Examiner correctly concedes that the combination of Lynn, Humes and Swift does not teach all of the features of claim. However, the Examiner relies on Crawford to make up for the deficient teachings of Lynn, Humes and Swift. Applicant respectfully disagrees and submits that the combination of Lynn, Humes, Swift and Crawford does not teach or suggest all of the features of claim 1. In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner merely relies on Crawford for the proposition that it teaches a "technique for obscuring the content of the image data." (See pg. 3 of the Office Action) Even assuming *arguendo* that Crawford does teach a technique for obscuring content of image data, the combination still does not teach or suggest all of the features of claim 1. As pointed out above, Lynn, Humes and Swift, either alone or in combination, fails to teach or suggest "an integrated circuit ... for processing said image data, wherein, for *each* of the plural pixels, said *image data comprises* at least *first and second* portions of image data that are *linked together*, the *first portion* including *payload data* and the *second portion* including *metadata*, wherein said payload data comprises content for the pixel and said *metadata comprises a value* selected from a predefined set of values *which classifies the pixel independently from the other pixels*, whereby, because *each of the processable pixels are individually classified* according to a *particular metadata value* selected from the predefined set of values, ... said integrated circuit comprising: *a filter for obscuring the content* of *only* a plurality of pixels that has a *metadata value* that *exceeds a discretionary threshold* value without preventing the display of the content of the remaining plurality of pixels that *does not have a metadata value* that exceeds the discretionary threshold value."



Crawford, like Lynn, Humes and Swift, fails to teach or suggest at least that each pixel comprises first and second portions that are linked together and that the first portion includes payload data comprising content and that the second portion comprises a value which classifies the pixel independently from other pixels, as claimed. Even assuming *arguendo* that Crawford teaches obscuring content of an image, Crawford, like Lynn, Humes and Swift, does not teach or suggest a filter for obscuring the content of *only* a plurality of pixels that has a *metadata value* that *exceeds a discretionary threshold* value without preventing the display of the content of the remaining plurality of pixels that *does not have a metadata value* that exceeds the discretionary threshold value. There is no teaching or suggestion in Crawford relating to classification of pixels and there certainly is no teaching or suggestion relating to classification of a pixel based on a value in each pixel that is contained within metadata, as required by claim 1. As such, the combination of Lynn, Humes, Swift and Crawford do not teach or suggest all of the features of claim 1 for these additional reasons (discussed above).

For at least the foregoing reasons, Applicant submits that the *numerous* combinations of references are deficient and do not teach or suggest all of the features of claim 1. Applicant therefore respectfully requests the Examiner to reconsider and withdraw the § 103(a) rejection of claim 1 and its dependent claims 16 and 25.

Since claims 3, 14, 19 and 29 contain features that are analogous to, though not necessarily coextensive with, the features recited in claim 1, Applicant submits that claims 3 and 14 and their respective dependent claims 5, 17, 26, 15, 18, and 27 as well as independent claims 29 and 19 as well as its dependent claims 20-24 and 28 are patentable at least for reasons analogous to those submitted for claim 1.

## **II. Rejection of Claim 5 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103**

Claim 5 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lynn, Humes, Swift, Crawford and Reilly (U.S. Patent No. 6,580,422; hereinafter “Reilly”). Applicant respectfully traverses this rejection for at least the following reasons.

As discussed above, Lynn, Humes, Swift and Crawford are deficient vis-à-vis independent claim 3, and Reilly does not make up for the deficiencies of Lynn, Humes, Swift and Crawford. Accordingly claim 5 is patentable at least by virtue of its dependency from claim

3. Applicant therefore respectfully requests the Examiner to reconsider and withdraw the § 103(a) rejection of claim 5.

### **III. Rejection of Claims 16-17 & 24 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103**

Claims 16, 17 and 24 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lynn in view of Humes, Swift, Crawford and Blumenau (U.S. Patent No. 6,108,637; hereinafter "Blumenau"). Applicant respectfully traverses this rejection for at least the following reasons.

As discussed above, Lynn, Humes, Swift and Crawford are deficient vis-à-vis independent claims 1, 3 and 19, and Blumenau does not make up for the deficiencies of Lynn, Humes, Swift and Crawford. Accordingly, claims 16, 17 and 24 are patentable at least by virtue of their respective dependencies from claims 1, 3 and 19. Applicant therefore respectfully requests the Examiner to reconsider and withdraw the § 103(a) rejection of claims 16, 17 and 24.

### **IV. Rejection of Claim 18 Under 35 U.S.C. § 103**

Claim 18 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Lynn in view of Humes, Swift, Crawford and Applicant's Admitted Prior Art (AAPA). Applicant respectfully traverses this rejection for at least the following reasons.

As noted above, Lynn, Humes, Swift and Crawford are deficient vis-à-vis independent claim 14, and the AAPA does not compensate for the deficiencies of Lynn, Humes, Swift and Crawford. Accordingly, claim 18 is patentable at least by virtue of its dependency from claim 14. Applicant therefore respectfully requests the Examiner to reconsider and withdraw the § 103(a) rejection of claim 18.


### **V. Conclusion**

In view of the foregoing remarks, Applicant respectfully submits that all of the claims of the present application are in condition for allowance. It is respectfully requested that a Notice of Allowance be issued in due course. Examiner Vu is encouraged to contact Applicant's undersigned attorney to resolve any remaining issues in order to expedite examination of the present application.

Appl. No.: 09/753,844  
Amdt. dated January 12, 2007  
Reply to Office Action of November 16, 2006

It is not believed that extensions of time or fees for net addition of claims are required, beyond those that may otherwise be provided for in documents accompanying this paper. However, in the event that additional extensions of time are necessary to allow consideration of this paper, such extensions are hereby petitioned under 37 CFR § 1.136(a), and any fee required therefore (including fees for net addition of claims) is hereby authorized to be charged to Deposit Account No. 16-0605.

Respectfully submitted,



Gay R. Gosnell  
Registration No. 34,610

**Customer No. 00826**  
**ALSTON & BIRD LLP**  
Bank of America Plaza  
101 South Tryon Street, Suite 4000  
Charlotte, NC 28280-4000  
Tel Charlotte Office (704) 444-1000  
Fax Charlotte Office (704) 444-1111

**ELECTRONICALLY FILED USING THE EFS-WEB ELECTRONIC FILING SYSTEM OF THE UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE ON JANUARY 12, 2007.**